Forecasting | Charles Kurzman

Failing to Forecast the Israeli-Palestinian Crisis

Charles Kurzman, “Failing to Forecast the Israeli-Palestinian Crisis,” The Washington Post’s Monkey Cage blog, July 29, 2014. “A month ago, three Israeli teenagers were found murdered near Hebron, presumably by Palestinians. Then a Palestinian teenager was found murdered in Jerusalem, presumably by Israelis. Within days, war had broken out between Hamas and Israel. Was this conflict predictable? In a general sense it can hardly be considered a surprise. But the timing of the conflict, sparked by murder and revenge – how could that be predicted?” More…

When Forecasts Fail

Charles Kurzman and Aseem Hasnain, “When Forecasts Fail: Unpredictability in Israeli-Palestinian Interaction,” Sociological Science, 1:239-259, June 2014. “This article explores the paradox that forecasts may be most likely to fail during dramatic moments of historic change that social scientists are most eager to predict. It distinguishes among four types of shocks that can undermine the predictive power of time series analyses: effect shocks that change the size of the causal effect; input shocks that change the causal variables; duration shocks that change how long a causal effect lasts; and actor shocks that change the number of agents in the system. The significance of these shocks is illustrated in Israeli–Palestinian interactions, one of the contemporary world’s most intensely scrutinized episodes, using vector autogression analyses of more than 15,000 Reuters news stories over the past three decades. The intervention of these shocks raises the prospect that some historic episodes may be unpredictable, even retrospectively.” More…

The Arab Spring Uncoiled

Charles Kurzman, “The Arab Spring Uncoiled,” Mobilization, Vol. 17, No. 4, December 2012, pp. 377-390. “Since the ‘Arab Spring’ emerged in the winter of 2011 … observers have rushed to explain mass revolts in the region. This introduction … reviews some of the explanations offered for these extraordinary events, and finds that the factors that are frequently cited in these explanations do not map comfortably onto the sites of greatest protest in the region. The essay then suggests an alternative approach, one that looks past causation in an attempt to understand the lived experience of the uprisings.” More…

Ignore All the Iran Experts

Charles Kurzman, “Ignore All the Iran Experts,” ForeignPolicy.com, June 17, 2009. “Troops are out in Iran this week, but in many cases the crowds have grown so large that the security forces are standing back and letting them swarm silently and peacefully through the boulevards — just like in 1978. … But the biggest similarity between the current protests and the Islamic revolution is the population’s widespread confusion about what comes next. In a year from now, people will look back on this week and say that what happened was inevitable. Whatever happens, they will predict the outcome retroactively.” More…

The Unthinkable Revolution in Iran

Charles Kurzman, The Unthinkable Revolution in Iran (Harvard University Press, 2004). (Persian translation of Chapter 1: فصل نخست.) “The shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, would remain on the throne for the foreseeable future: This was the firm conclusion of a top-secret CIA analysis issued in October 1978. One hundred days later the shah — despite his massive military, fearsome security police, and superpower support — was overthrown by a popular and largely peaceful revolution.” More…