

A DYNAMIC VIEW OF RESOURCES: EVIDENCE FROM THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION

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ABSTRACT

The so-called "mosque network" was not always a powerful resource for revolution in Iran. Prior to the revolutionary movement of 1977-1979, the mosques were infiltrated and repressed by the shah's security forces, and largely controlled by non-revolutionary clerics. The mosque network remained a potential resource, not an actual resource, until it was successfully commandeered by the militant minority within the Shi'i Muslim clergy. This paper documents this process and suggests that the value of resources should be treated as variable, not constant.

Resource-mobilization theory tends to treat resources as static. The classic text, Charles Tilly's *From Mobilization to Revolution* (1978), defines mobilization as the process by which a group gains collective control over its members' (or others') resources. Schematically:

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Quantity of resources collectively controlled x probability of delivery = mobilization (p.84)

The central question, then, is to estimate for each resource "(a) the value of the resource nominally under group control, and (b) the probability that the resource will be delivered when called for" (p. 78).

This paper will suggest, by contrast, that the value of a resource is highly fluid. A bottle or a house, for example, may not be useful in itself to a protest movement. Converted into a Molotov cocktail or a safe house, however, it might become very useful. Another example is movement organization, which can strengthen a protest movement or stifle it, or both. Ideology, solidarity, money—all sorts of resources may be useful at one point, irrelevant at other points, and counter-productive at others.

Mobilization, then, is not just the delivery of resources, but also the re-valuing of resources. It involves turning what you have into what you need. Metaphorically, mobilization is not simply gathering gold, but also spinning straw into gold. To distinguish the straw from the gold, I will use the terms "potential resources" and "actual resources." Mobilization is the process of converting one into the other.

The resource-mobilization tradition has paid some attention to this subject. Freeman (1983, p. 9) and McAdam (1982, p. 149) discuss the coopting of potential resources. Gamson (1968, Chap. 5) theorizes the concept of power in much the same terms. Tilly's (1978) analysis of protest repertoires suggests something similar: the invention of new forms of protest creates resources out of activities not previously seen as resources.

This undercurrent in resource-mobilization theory deserves more concerted attention, because the concept of potential resources cuts to the heart of social-movement theory. It affects our thinking about which groups are well placed to pursue protest movements, and which are not. If resources may be invisible prior to their conversion and use, then predicting successful movements becomes all but impossible. Such a situation is not to be feared, but embraced. It opens up the theoretical possibility for successful protest action by those who are not, by traditional criteria, resource-rich. In addition, it reminds us that protest outcomes are not pre-determined.

The Iranian Revolution, I will argue, saw just such a conversion of potential resources. Through the process of protest, a small cadre was able to take over a large but somewhat hidebound organization and turn it into a powerful resource for revolution. It did so from a relatively weak starting point, repressed by state security forces and restrained by timid leadership.¹

This is not the usual picture of the Iranian *rūhānīyat*.² The Shi'i Muslim clerics in Iran are generally considered resource-rich, with particular emphasis given to the so-called "mosque network."³ It is undeniable that the tens of thousands of mosques and other religious buildings played a central role in the Iranian Revolution.⁴ They provided public meeting space and an opportunity to distribute leaflets and information. They were the starting point for countless demonstrations, and the distribution point for funds raised privately from the faithful, in the form of religious taxes.⁵ As a human resource, the *ruhānīyat* had lines of communication which allowed them to coordinate actions around the country, and a traditional position of legitimacy and solidarity in Iranian society. As an ideological resource, Shi'i Islam spoke out for revolution in a voice understood by the Iranian populace.

It is not surprising, then, that a number of observers have tried to explain the Iranian Revolution in terms of the revolutionaries' resources. Many refer explicitly to sociological resource-mobilization theories,⁶ and almost every analysis of the revolution makes some passing mention of the mosque network, or the organization of the *ruhānīyat*, or the conduciveness of Shi'i Islam to revolutionary mobilization.

But this common picture of the *ruhānīyat* is a snapshot taken at the end of the revolutionary movement, not at the beginning. Too many of these analyses extrapolate backwards from the victorious group's final assets and presume that these resources were equally valuable at the outset of the movement. In this way they share resource-mobilization theory's static view of resources. This paper will give two counter-examples—the safety of the mosques and the ideology of Shi'i Islam—in which the value of the resource was initially quite poor. The paper will then suggest several methods by which these potential resources were converted into actual resources.

DANGEROUS MOSQUES

It is one of the prime myths of the Iranian Revolution—propagated in part by secularists seeking to discredit the clerics' post-revolutionary regime—that the Pahlavi state ignored or tolerated its religious opponents, while repressing severely the secular ones. In this view, the mosque network was left intact while other oppositionist organizations were destroyed. For instance:

The security forces had focused mainly on the college community, civil and military servants, the large industrial organizations, and other middle-class people who were politically concerned. These new [religious] activists were not only unknown to the authorities, but there was additionally no way to cut their lines of communication. Their organization was, therefore, uncrushable.⁷

This view is inaccurate. Religious activists, like their secular counterparts, were known to the authorities, arrested, tortured, exiled, and killed by the Pahlavi regime. A partial listing is presented in Appendix 1.

As in all such regimes, the persecution of the few led to the paranoia of the many.⁸ Religious oppositionists did not feel safe, and went to great pains to keep their activities secret. One *âyatullah* in Tehran apparently requested that American Embassy visitors park several blocks away, and that they not identify themselves over the phone, on the assumption that SAVAK—the secret police—had him under surveillance *Asnâd-i Lânih-i Jâsûsî*, Vol. 7, p. 23). A cleric in the holy city of Qum grew to fear a government trap and stopped going to women's houses for his "temporary marriages."⁹ A follower of *Âyatullah Mutahhari* in Tehran didn't share oppositionist tracts with many of his friends because he wasn't sure he could trust them.¹⁰ A religious student from Qum, who after the revolution became a cleric, recalled the atmosphere of repression in a somewhat heroic mode:

At that time, in 1977, pictures of Imam Khomeini were banned. Whoever was caught with one, his hands were cut off [figuratively speaking], in the time of the shah, in 1977. One time I took one to a photography shop.... When the photographer saw the picture of Imam Khomeini, he said, 'This is banned. This is forbidden.' I told him, 'I want a thousand copies of this printed.' He cried and kissed the picture and put it to his chest. He printed it and would accept no money from me.¹¹

In sum, religious oppositionists did not feel exempt from Pahlavi repression, and did not act as though they were.

While individual clerics were subject to surveillance and repression, mosques and other religious sites were also vulnerable. In early June 1975, for example, when religious students demonstrated at the Fayzîyih Seminary in Qum, police closed off the entrance with a water cannon, lobbed tear gas into the courtyard, then attacked and ransacked the building. Rumors abounded of students killed by the commandos, some thrown off the seminary roof (*Guzârish-i Kâmil* 1976; Fischer 1980, p. 125). In another case, in June 1978, a demonstration at the New Mosque in Shiraz brought on a military attack:

The soldiers poured into the mosque. They burned the motorcycles that were in the mosque courtyard. They dragged the people who were trying to escape outside. 'We didn't do anything,' they kept saying but the police put handcuffs on them and threw them into the trucks anyway. I saw this with my own eyes (Hegland 1986, p. 874).

The security forces attacked a variety of religious sites throughout 1978. Appendix 2 contains a partial list.

In addition to these instances of open repression, there was a general suspicion that mosques could be infiltrated by state agents.¹² A recurrent anecdote in Iran described a class of religious students with undercover agents in their midst. The cleric tells his students to untie their turbans, and then to tie them up again. The agents are unable to re-tie their turbans and are thus identified.¹³ A factory worker near Isfahan was asked if he and other oppositionists met in their village mosque:

Yes but generally if you wanted to talk (politics) it was in hiding, for the people themselves were against us; when a mullah wanted to make a speech, the people opposed it; they were afraid that they (the agents of the regime) would come and burn everything, destroy everything.¹⁴

Mihdî Bâzargân, an engineer and one of the lay leaders of the religious opposition, has commented that mosques were safer than other locations:

In spite of the power of the security forces, the mosques and religious centers were sanctuaries where we met, talked, prepared, organized and grew.¹⁵

This statement must be weighed against all of the evidence suggesting the infiltration of such sanctuaries. A teenager from Tabriz, for instance, recalled that he and other oppositionists went to the mosque because “we could talk there.” But asked if that meant there was no fear of the security forces inside the mosque, he continued, “Sure we were afraid. We only talked with people we knew. If someone was in the mosque who we didn’t know, we didn’t talk.”¹⁶

To sum up, there is strong evidence that the mosque network—both the oppositional ruhanis and the physical buildings—were not immune to state surveillance and repression. This was not necessarily continuous: one day a protest prayer-rally might be allowed to take place peacefully, and the next day one might be crushed. In this sense, the value of the mosque network was less than ideal. The ruhaniyat’s control over the mosques was not always sufficient to turn them into safe havens for revolt.

The same situation prevailed in other social institutions in Pahlavi Iran. The universities provide a dramatic example. The mood on Iranian campuses was virulently oppositional, as British Ambassador Anthony Parsons says he noted in conversations with the shah:

‘I’ve been in America at the worst time of the Kent State riots and all that kind of thing. I’ve seen our universities in Britain. I’ve served in places like Egypt where there’s always university turbulence.’ And I said, ‘I can tell you, your Majesty, that I have never seen anything nearly as bad as the atmosphere on every single university campus in your country.’... There was an atmosphere of sullenness, of alienation, of discontent.... You could say that you could cut the atmosphere with a blunt knife. I was very, very struck by this.¹⁷

Only violent repression kept the opposition from using the universities as a stronghold. In the late 1960s, an American Peace Corps teacher stumbled across one of countless incidents: “I happened to witness a shock force of National Police invade Tehran University during a student strike. The troops clubbed viciously and indiscriminately, keeping at it after blood was bubbling on the faces of young women as well as young men” (Rosen and Rosen 1982, p. 46).

Still, the universities, like the mosque network, had the potential to become valuable resources for social protest. They brought like-minded people together in an organizational setting which could never be perfectly suppressed. As one activist at Tabriz University recalled,

You realize that outside of the universities, there was practically no political movement. That is, the strangulation and surveillance which had been introduced, which the regime had introduced in all official spheres, was very heavy.... The only place it couldn’t completely control was the university, since the university was principally a place of gatherings.... SAVAK couldn’t send an agent to follow every student whenever he went to see his teacher.¹⁸

Certainly more university students than ruhanis were arrested and killed; but university students were more confrontational, as well. If it were possible to control statistically for the level of protest, repression of both groups might be quite similar. In any case, I would argue, repression is essentially a subjective matter: arrests and killings do not count so much as the fear instilled in the group being repressed. Fear is difficult to measure comparatively, but there is no evidence that either universities or mosques suffered significantly more or less fear than the other.

Mosques infiltrated by security agents—like infiltrated classrooms or infiltrated cafes—should be considered *potential* resources, assets which have the potential to be captured and converted into *actual* resources. The distinction is one of liquidity: a potential resource cannot easily be “spent,” while an actual one can. Cash-on-hand is an actual resource; pledged donations are potential. Guns and bullets are actual; either one separately is potential. It is not a simple matter to distinguish actual from potential resources in any given historical case; I am merely using the distinction to point out that the value of a resource is not constant.

A resource’s liquidity, in turn, is related to the issue of control.¹⁹ Sometimes control may take the form of coordination, bringing several ingredients together. It may take the form of know-how, the ability to transform a potential resource into an actual one. It may take the form of experience, a history of mobilizing in a certain way. It may take the form of re-assignment, the ability to free up resources committed elsewhere. It may take the form, as in the case of the Iranian mosques, of a certain zealotry, a willingness to mobilize despite the risks, as evidenced by a former seminary student from Qum:

If a high-ranking cleric gave me the order, I’d have to go and die. Dying would be a sign of my morality. If he ordered me to go, say, all the way to the White House in America, I’d have to.... If I didn’t go, I wouldn’t be a Muslim.²⁰

Most of the ruhaniyat was less committed politically than this individual, and some even supported the monarchy. So the taking of control from the state was linked with the taking of control from the non-revolutionary clerics who controlled the mosque network.

SHI'Ī ISLAM AS AN IDEOLOGICAL RESOURCE

Another myth is that Shi'ī Islam, the faith of almost 90 percent of Iranians (Iran Almanac 1975, p. 395), is inherently revolutionary, that it presents an ideological resource for social protest.

Shii Islam offered an ideological view of history that gave meaning and legitimation to an opposition movement. Shii Islam is a religion of protest with an ideology and symbolism well suited to protest and opposition.²¹

Shi'ism, the second branch of Islam numerically after Sunnism, dates back to the first century of Islam (the 7th Christian century). The basis of the schism was succession to the Prophet Muhammad. These positions did not emerge full-blown, but most early Muslims believed that successors should be selected by the community of believers. However, one group, which later became known as Shi'at 'Alī (The Party of 'Alī, the Prophet's son-in-law), believed that successors should be selected by divine nomination, and that this nomination was inherited by the Prophet's descendents. The schism developed as Sunnis captured the caliphate, while the Shi'ī pretenders—the Prophet's grandsons, one of their sons, and so on—were each killed, according to Shi'ī tradition, by agents of Sunni caliphs. The twelfth in the Shi'ī line was a child, Abū'l-Qāsim Muhammad, who went into a state of "occultation," or hidden-ness, in 260 A.H./874 A.D. For almost 70 years the Twelfth Imam had a series of agents to represent him, but after this time he became completely inaccessible to his Shi'ī followers, and he remains so today. However, Shi'īs believe the Twelfth Imam will return one day as a messiah to establish the reign of Islam under his just rulership.

In the absence of the Twelfth Imam, however, Shi'īs have no clearly legitimate leader. Shi'ī clerics have split on the issue on whether to obey or resist worldly authorities. Some have justified quiescence by focusing on the Qur'ānic verse:

O believers, obey God, and obey the Messenger [the Prophet Muhammad] and those in authority among you.... (Arjomand 1988b; p. 1; Momen 1985, p. 192).

Others have argued that the ruhaniyat itself has the right to rule, based, among other things, on a statement attributed to the Imam 'Alī, the Prophet's son-in-law and the first of the 12 imams:

[The Prophet Muhammad] was then asked: 'O Messenger of God, who are those that succeed you?' He replied: 'They are those that come after me, transmit my traditions and practice, and teach them to the people after me.'²²

Historically, both views have held sway at different times, as Shi'ism has served both as an ideology of acquiescence to authority and of revolt.²³ Shi'ī Islam has more of a revolutionary history than Sunni Islam, but it is not necessarily revolutionary. The question is not whether Shi'ism is inherently a resource for Iranian social protest, but how and when it becomes a resource—how, at any given moment, the activist interpretation displaces the quietist interpretation. We must reject essentialist analyses of Islam in favor of social history (Nuri-'Ala, 1980; Fischer 1982).

So the issue of revolutionary Shi'ism translates into the issue of revolutionary Shi'īs—the people who believe that Shi'ism requires them to be politically active, to risk their lives, and to protest. In pre-revolutionary Iran, revolutionary Shi'īs were in the distinct minority, even among the ruhaniyat. The dominant philosophy was one of passivism.

Non-revolutionary ruhānis had cleansed the manuals of religious obligations (*risālih-yi 'amalīyah*) of all hints of activism: even the famous Qur'ānic subject of "bidding good and forbidding evil," often used as the basis for clerical activism, had disappeared from the manuals, and "came to be seen as quite superfluous, ... no longer worth discussing, ... [and] irrelevant to the times." (Motahari 1985; p. 212). Non-revolutionary ruhānis dominated the mosque network as well. One revolutionary cleric complained after the revolution that most of the ruhaniyat had preferred to remain silent, hanging the shah's picture in their mosques and keeping their complaints to themselves.²⁴ On several occasions, leading ruhānis all but shooed demonstrators out of their mosques. In Qum in January 1978, an āyatullah harangued a group of radical seminary students, fearing a repeat of the attack on the Fayziyah Seminary:

I know that steps must be taken [politically], and I am taking them, but this sort of thing—my view is that it must be peaceful, not in such a way that they will do in the 'Azam Mosque, too, like the Fayzīyah Seminary.²⁵

In Isfahan in July 1978, another āyatullah urged relatives of political prisoners to leave his house:

Dear respected sisters, I implore you to end your sit-in and hunger strike and return to your homes. Rest assured that if, God forbid, the aforementioned acceptance of your demands proves illusory, you can come back to me (*Zamīnih-i Khabar-Nānih*, No. 20, Sept.-Oct. 1978, p. 29).

The non-revolutionary ruhāniyat did have political and social complaints. In interviews with four clerics in 1974, both moderates and radicals, an Iranian social scientist found “considerable unanimity of grievance” about secularization, foreign influence, state control, and “the entire trend of Iranian society” (Tehrānian 1980, pp. 28, 21). The moderates, however, favored reformist solutions. As late as December 1978, with the revolution in full swing, Āyatullah Kāzim Shari'at-Madārī—one of the most prominent ruhānis in Iran—told reporters that overthrow of the Pahlavi dynasty was not necessary. “What we have in the [1906] constitution is enough, if it is implemented” (*The Los Angeles Times*, Dec. 9, 1978, p. I:12). The 1906 document set up a constitutional monarchy with veto-power oversight by a panel of mujtahids.

The revolutionary ruhānis—the leaders of the anti-shah movement and the post-revolutionary government—were younger and not generally in positions of control as the revolution broke out. Khomeini was in exile, though he maintained a role in the Qum religious establishment;²⁶ Āyatullahs Mahmūd Tāliqānī and Husein-'Alī Muntazirī were in jail; Āyatullah Muhammad Bihishtī had stopped teaching because of his repeated arrest (Bihishtī 1981, p. 16). The rest of the clerical revolutionaries were of middle-rank or lower. Many were seminary students.²⁷

If Shi'ī Islam was a revolutionary resource, then, it was strictly a potential one. The dominant interpretation within the ruhāniyat was reformist and non-confrontational. The activist, revolutionary interpretation was weakly positioned institutionally. Meanwhile, Islam was gaining in popularity in Iran in the decade before the revolution—pilgrimages were on the increase, religious neighborhood associations multiplied, the well-to-do formed mystical groups,

intellectuals formed study groups, newly urbanized peasants took on strict Muslim discipline.²⁸ But for this rising religious sentiment to be applied to a protest movement, the revolutionary clerics had to be in a position to mobilize it.

CONVERTING POTENTIAL RESOURCES

The revolutionary ruhānis needed to convert Islam from a potential resource into an actual one. This meant persuading the non-revolutionary religious leaders not to oppose them, and to allow the resources under their control to be used for revolutionary purposes. The radicals pursued this task through the act of social protest.

The primary tactic was to challenge the moderates publicly, in effect embarrassing them into a more revolutionary position (Bakhash 1984, pp. 177f). Khomeini spoke repeatedly on this theme. For instance, in 1971:

I consider it my duty to cry out with all the strength at my command and to write and publish with whatever power my pen may have. Let my colleagues do the same—if they consider it proper, if they regard themselves as belonging to the nation of Islam, if they consider themselves to be Shi'a—let them give some thought to what needs to be done (Khomeini 1981, p. 206).

One of the first religious street protests of the revolutionary period was also played out on this theme. On January 7, 1978, a national newspaper ran an article insulting Khomeini as a romantic poet and a British agent and calling him alone among the ruhāniyat in opposing the government (*Ittilā'āt*, Jan. 7, 1978, p. 7). Some of the seminary students in Qum

called off classes, and then, on the advice of their instructors [two mid-level followers of Khomeini], they said, ‘Let's go and ask the *marāji'* [religious leaders], the theology teachers of the religious circles, what their view is on this article.’²⁹

The next day, the students marched from house to house, calling on high-ranking clerics to come outside and respond to the newspaper charges. The responses were fairly mild, denouncing the insult to Khomeini but refusing to denounce the government itself, and defensively claiming oppositional status. “These people [the government authorities] are lying when they say we agree with their

works. The *'ulamâ'* [clerics] are all in the opposition," said Âyatullah Muhammad-Rizâ Gulpâyigânî, according to one account.³⁰ By way of example, according to another account, he said, "I telegraphed parliament [several years ago on another matter], but they didn't pay any attention (*Nabard-i Tûdih'hâ* 1978, p. 2).

On the second day of the students' rounds, January 9, the police opened fire on the crowd, killing a number of youths.³¹ Now the *marâjî*'s statements were more pointed. Still, however, they focused on the tragedy, and not on the legitimacy of the state; they called for mourning ceremonies, but not for political protests.³² Khomeini responded from exile with a somewhat back-handed compliment:

The great *marâjî*' of Islam in Qum have expressed themselves courageously both in their speeches and in their [written] declarations, including the one they issued two or three days ago on the occasion of the fortieth day after the massacre and the general strike ordained for that day, and they have stated who is responsible for the crime—not explicitly, it is true, but by implication, which is more effective. May God keep them steadfast (Khomeini 1981, p. 212-213).

This dynamic continued throughout the year of revolution: radical ruhanis challenging reformists and pressuring them with public invitations to join the revolutionary movement, reformist ruhanis being pulled somewhat reluctantly along.

A second tactic of the revolutionaries was to subject themselves to state repression, thereby radicalizing the moderates. As one ruhani noted in a mosque speech in late March, "No movement is born without martyrs" (*Khabar-Nâmih*, April 6, 1978, p. 25). For example, the moderate religious leaders called for restraint in the 40th-day mourning ceremonies for the January killings in Qum. As Âyatullah Kâzim Shari'at-Madârî said in an open letter, "It is our expectation that the Muslim public will maintain complete dignity and calm in the observation of the aforementioned ceremonies." (*Darbârih-i Qiyâm*, Vol. 1, pp. 88; *Davânî* Vol. 7; p. 71).

In the northwestern city of Tabriz, however, mourners arrived for a memorial service at the central mosque and found it locked and guarded by police.³³ A crowd gathered, which quickly turned hostile and overran the police, then set about trashing banks and liquor stores and government buildings. Even sympathetic sources say that the crowd—or radicals within the crowd—initiated the violence.³⁴ The state reacted with a massive application of force, bringing in

troops and tanks from nearby bases and killing perhaps over one hundred Tabrizis.³⁵ As a result, Shari'at-Madârî was forced to come out with a statement defending the radicals, whose methods he no doubt condemned. "When the government, itself, does not respect the law, and discriminates in its application, what can it expect of others?"³⁶

On several occasions, revolutionaries brought their point home directly, taking sanctuary at the houses of senior moderate clerics and counting on their protection. Relatives of political prisoners staged sit-ins at Âyatullah Khâdimî's house in Isfahan and at Âyatullah Mar'ashî-Najafî's house in Qum, and radical ruhanis sat in again in August at Khâdimî's house, protesting the arrest of a revolutionary cleric.³⁷ Both of these âyatullahs remained non-revolutionary, but they allowed portions of the mosque network under their control to be used for more radical purposes. These sanctuaries were still not immune to state repression; the August sit-in was forcibly cleared out by security forces.³⁸

A third tactic was to threaten the moderates with hard-ball lobbying, reminding them in less than respectful terms that a public image of acquiescence would do little for their popularity. Âyatullah Muhammad Sadûqî, a close associate of Khomeini's from his days as a seminary student in Qum in the 1930s (*Khalkhâli* Vol. 2, p. 577), specialized in this form of pressure. In a letter to Âyatullah Khu'î in Najaf, he wrote:

Not a single sentence has been heard from your direction expressing your disgust and hatred of these terrible actions [of the state]. Silence in the face of these inhuman acts might be a sign of approval of such treason.... (*Zamimih-i Khabar-Nâmih*, July-Aug. 1978, pp. 16-17).

In a letter to Âyatullah Khâdimî of Isfahan:

People, especially the young, expect the clergy to lead, and the silence of the clergy in response to the people is contrary to their expectation. The recent silence of the clergy has been extremely costly to the clerical community.³⁹

In a telegram to the three leading âyatullahs of Qum:

The cruelties of this oppressive regime are beyond what words can say and pens can write.... The Muslim people of Iran have been awaiting the

promulgation of the orders of the great religious leaders, and have been counting the days impatiently (Sadûqî 1983, p. 68).

One moderate cleric may have been physically threatened by Khomeini supporters.⁴⁰

Threats such as these should not be overemphasized, since moderates learned by themselves the hazards of their position. Shari'at-Madârî, for instance, apparently started a campaign for moderation in early fall 1978: "The negative reaction to Shariat-Madari's tentative first efforts was so great and so threatening that he has now lapsed into piqued and official silence."⁴¹ In city after city, learned elderly ruhanis found themselves losing popularity to brasher young politicians: Âyatullah Khâdimî to Âyatullah Tâhirî in Isfahan, for example, and Âyatullah Alémî to Âyatullah Milânî in Hamadan.⁴²

By early 1979, when the Pahlavi dynasty fell, non-revolutionary Shi'i leaders had been silenced and the entire mosque network was being used for revolution: for organizing demonstrations, coordinating general strikes, distributing scarce food, ensuring neighborhood security, and for handing out arms in the two final days of the upheaval.⁴³ This is the image commonly associated with the mosque network, but it is the image of an end-point, not a starting-point. Indeed, according to one analysis, this may have been "the first time in their history" that the clerics "unanimously turned against the state" (Moaddel 1986, p. 542). Prior to the protest movement, the mosque network and Shi'i ideology were not initially particularly valuable resources. They were potential resources that had to be converted into actual ones before they could be mobilized.

The theoretical point here is that resources do not have a given value. The ruhaniyat's organizational and ideological resources were of varying utility during the revolution, as revolutionary clerics struggled to wrest control from the state security forces and from non-revolutionary clerics. Estimating the value of resources in such a fluid situation seems less worthwhile than focusing on how and when these resources became valuable.

This paper has described several mechanisms by which valuable resources were created in Iran. Through these mechanisms, the radical ruhaniyat was able to build an effective revolutionary cadre. From late 1977 through the summer of 1978, advocates of quiescence

within the ruhaniyat were forced into silence, and fence-sitters were spurred into cooperation. By the end of this period, the process was complete. The cadre had gained virtually complete control over the "mosque network" and was able to generate protests around Iran with tens of thousands of participants.

APPENDIX 1. PARTIAL LISTING OF REPRESSION OF THE RUHANIYAT IN IRAN, 1970-1979

<i>Name:</i>	<i>Repression:</i>	<i>Place:</i>	<i>Source:</i>
<i>1970</i>			
Ây. Muhammad-Rizâ Sa'îdî	Dies under torture	Tehran	Khalkhâli Vol. 1, p. 230
Ây. Mahmûd Tâliqânî	Arrested for attending Ây. Sa'îdî's funeral	Tehran	Fischer 1980b, p. 97
48 ruhanis	Exiled internally for writing Khomeini		Fischer 1980b, p. 97
Huj. Nûrallah Tabâtabâ'i-Nizhâd	Banned from pulpit, sent to SAVAK	Ardistân, Isfahan	Khalkhâli Vol. 1, p. 130
<i>1971</i>			
Ây. Hussein Ghafârî	Arrested		Khalkhâli Vol. 1, p. 248
Huj. Muhammad Muntazirî	Forced to flee Iran		Murâdî Vol. 1, p. 140
'Abdul-Husein Subhânî	Arrested and tortured, dies in 1972		Khalkhâli Vol. 2, p. 99
Huj. Ghulâm-Hussein Haqqânî	Jailed for several months		<i>Fishtâzân</i> 1981, p. 94
<i>1972</i>			
Ây. Murtizâ Mutahhari	Arrested		Murâdî Vol. 1, p. 107
<i>1973</i>			
Huj. Muhammad Javâd Bâhunar	Surveilled, arrested		<i>Fishtâzân</i> 1981, p. 56
Ây. Abdul-Rahim Rabbânî-Shirâzî	Arrested, tortured for a month, internally exiled		Murâdî Vol. 1, p. 118
18 other clerics	Jailed at Qasr Prison over the next two years		Davânî Vol. 6, pp. 97-98
<i>1974</i>			
Ây. Husein Ghafârî	Dies under torture	Tehran	Khalkhâli Vol. 1, p. 248
Huj. Hâdî Ghafârî	Arrested		Khalkhâli Vol. 1, p. 248
Ây. Husein-'Alî Muntazirî	Exiled internally	Khalkhâl, Saqez	Izadi 1983, pp. 171, 180

(continued)

APPENDIX 1. (CONTINUED)

Name:	Repression:	Place:	Source:
1974 (continued) Āy. 'Abdul-Husein Dastghayb	Imprisoned	Tehran	<i>Pishtāzân</i> 1981, p. 28
1975 Huj. Ghulām-Husein Haqqāni	Arrested, sentenced to 12 years, tortured for 4 months		<i>Pishtāzân</i> 1981, p. 94
Āy. Muhammad-Huseini Bihishti	Arrested		<i>Pishtāzân</i> 1981, p. 16
Āy. Hussein-'Alī Muntaziri	Arrested		Īzādi 1983, p. 184
Eight other ruhanis	Arrested		Abrahamian 1982, p. 445
300 seminary students	Arrested after demonstration, June	Qum	Fischer 1980a, p. 125
Huj. 'Abbās Mūsavi Qūchāni	Arrested, sentenced to 2 years in prison, October		Khalkhāli Vol. 2, p. 451
Huj. Muhammad Mufattih	Arrested		Murādi Vol. 2, p. 2
Tal. Qurbān-'Alī Bahrāmi	Arrested for distributing Khomeini literature in a mosque	Sāfi	Khalkhāli Vol. 2, p. 334
1976 Tal. Nasratallah Ansāri-Qazvini	Dies under torture		Khalkhāli Vol. 1, p. 237
Tal. Muhammad-'Alī Muvahhidi	Dies under torture		Khalkhāli Vol. 1, p. 252
Tal. Rajab 'Alī Mūsavi	Arrested for distributing Khomeini literature, tortured 8 months	Shāh-Rizā	Khalkhāli Vol. 2, p. 162
Tal. Muhammad Sālam Hūsi	Arrested, August	Mashhad	Khalkhāli Vol. 2, p. 290
Huj. 'Alī Safarzādih	Disappears		Khalkhāli Vol. 1, p. 259
1977 Āy. Mahmūd Tāliqāni	Arrested, sentenced to 10 years	Tehran	<i>Asnād-i Lānih</i> , Vol. 12:1, p. 35
Huj. Mustafā Khomeini	Dies, presumed poisoned by SAVAK	Najaf, Iraq	<i>Shahidi Digar</i> (1977)
Talabihis, unknown numbers	Beaten, arrested at mourning ceremonies		<i>Shahidi Digar</i> 1977, p. 252

(continued)

APPENDIX 1. (CONTINUED)

Name:	Repression:	Place:	Source:
1977 (continued) Huj. Rabbāni-Shīrāzi	Imprisoned		Davāni Vol. 7, pp. 10-11
9 other ruhanis	Imprisoned or exiled in the fall of 1977		<i>Asnād-i Lānih</i> Vol. 12:1, p. 35
1978 50 ruhanis	Exiled internally, January to June		<i>Asnād-i Nihzat</i> , pp. 141-143; <i>Zamīnih</i> No. 18, <i>Murdād</i> 1357, pp. 27-28
3 talabihis	Shot and killed in demonstrations, January	Qum	Khalkhāli Vol. 1, pp. 267-272
13 ruhanis	Exiled internally, January	Qum	<i>Dar-bārih</i> Vol. 1, pp. 58, 70; <i>Khabar-Nāmi</i> No. 1, 20 Bahman 1356, p. 4
Āy. Mahallāti	Exiled internally, January	Shiraz	<i>Khabar-Nāmi</i> No. 1, 20 Bahman 1356, p. 4
Tal. 'Alī Nūraddīni Bihbihāni	Killed during demonstration, January	Bihbihān	Khalkhāli Vol. 1, p. 275
Āy. Rabbāni-Shīrāzi	Exiled internally, February, re-exiled several times, March-April	Qum	<i>Khabar-Nāmi</i> No. 6, 17 Farv. 1357, p. 6
Tal. Murtizā Vā'izi	Shot and killed after firing on officers coming to arrest him, March	Tabriz	Khalkhāli Vol. 2, p. 101
Huj. Jalālaldīn Tāhiri and Huj. Muhammad Ahmadi Rūhāni	Exiled internally, March	Isfahan	<i>Khabar-Nāmi</i> No. 7, 30 Farv. 1357, p. 3
Āy. Nasir Makārim Shīrāzi	Exiled internally, April, and imprisoned		Millward 1980, pp. 61-62
Huj. Mūsavi	Exiled internally, April	Garmsār	<i>Khabar-Nāmi</i> No. 8, 10 Urd. 1357, p. 4
Huj. Rāshid Yazdi	Exiled internally, April	Yazd	<i>Khabar-Nāmi</i> No. 8, 10 Urd. 1357, p. 4

(continued)

APPENDIX 1. (CONTINUED)

Name:	Repression:	Place:	Source:
<i>1978 (continued)</i>			
Huj. Akbar Hamîdzâdih	Exiled internally, April	Tehran	<i>Khabar-Nâmih</i> No. 8, 10 Urd. 1357, p. 4
Huj. 'Alî-Akbar Qureishî and Huj. Muh. Taqî Sâhib al-Zamânî	Exiled internally, May	Rizaiyah	<i>Khabar-Nâmih</i> No. 9, 20 Urd. 1357, p. 4
Ây. Sâdiq Rûhânî	House arrest, May	Qum	<i>Khabar-Nâmih</i> No. 10, 30 Urd. 1357, p.5
Ây. Murtizâ Pasandîdih, Huj. Hâdî Khusrûshâhî, Huj. Kalântar, Huj. Zayghmî, Huj. Gulsurkhî, Huj. Mûsavî	Exiled internally, May	Qum	<i>Khabar-Nâmih</i> No. 10, 30 Urd. 1357, p.6
Huj. 'Alî Mishkîni	House attacked, May	Qum	<i>Khabar-Nâmih</i> No. 11, 10 Khurd. 1357, p. 5
Huj. Hâdî Bârikbîn	Exiled internally, May	Qazvîn	<i>Khabar-Nâmih</i> No. 11, 10 Khurd. 1357, p. 6
Huj. 'Alî Haydarî	Exiled internally, May	Nahâvand	<i>Khabar-Nâmih</i> No. 11, 10 Khurd. 1357, p. 6
Huj. Muhammad Tabâtâbâ'î	Arrested at Ây. Rûhânî's madrasah, May	Qum	<i>Khabar-Nâmih</i> No. 11, 10 Khurd. 1357, p. 6
Shaykh Abdullah Ghafârî	Shot and killed in Ây. Sharî'at-Madârî's house, May	Qum	Kraft, p. 136; <i>Lâlih'hâ</i> , p. 159
Tal. Sattâr Kâshânî	Killed during anti-government activity, May	Qum	Khalkhâlî Vol. 1, p. 280
Tal. Hussein Khaz'ali	Killed during protest, May	Qum	Khalkhâlî Vol. 2, p. 106
Tal. 'Alî 'Abdullahî	Killed by tank after protest May	Qum	Khalkhâlî Vol. 2, p. 118
Ây. Nâtiq Nûrî, Huj. Fazlullah Huj. Husein Razavî, Huj. Muvahhidî Ja'far Shujûnî, Sâvajî, Huj. Muvahhidî Qumî	Arrested, late May	Qum, Tehran	<i>Asnâd-i Lânih</i> Vol. 24, p. 12; <i>Khabar-Nâmih</i> No. 12, 20 Khurd. 1357, p. 5
Tal. 'Abbâs-'Alî Imâmî, Huj. 'Alî Sâlâr, Huj. 'Alî-Akbar Adab	Arrested, June	Samnân	<i>Khabar-Nâmih</i> No. 12, 20 Khurd. 1357, p. 8

(continued)

APPENDIX 1. (CONTINUED)

Name:	Repression:	Place:	Source:
<i>1978 (continued)</i>			
Huj. Nâtiq	Arrested, June	Isfahan	<i>Khabar-Nâmih</i> No. 14, 10 Tir 1357, p. 5
Huj. Mihdî Shâh-Âbâdî	Arrested, June	Shamîrân	<i>Khabar-Nâmih</i> No. 14, 10 Tir 1357, p. 6
Ây. Murtizâ Pasandîdih	Re-exiled, house arrest, July	Khomein	<i>Khabar-Nâmih</i> No. 15, 20 Tir 1357, p. 5
Huj. Mihdî Rabbânî-Amlashî	Re-exiled, July	Bâbuk	<i>Khabar-Nâmih</i> No. 15, 20 Tir 1357, p. 5
Huj. Assadallah Madanî	Re-exiled, July	Gunbâd-i Kâvûs	<i>Khabar-Nâmih</i> No. 15, 20 Tir 1357, p. 5
Shaykh Ahmad Kâfî	Killed in a car accident, presumably by SAVAK, July		Khalkhâlî Vol. 1, p. 285
Ây. Jalâl Tâhirî	Arrested, July, exiled internally	Isfahan	<i>Pârahî az I'lâmiyih'hâ</i> , p. 47
Huj. Châvushî, Huj. Tâhirî, Huj. Akhtari	Arrested, August	Tehran	<i>Khabar-Nâmih</i> No. 19, 30 Murd. 1357, pp. 5-6
Huj. Sâna'î, Huj. Tihirânî	Arrested, beaten, August	Tehran	<i>Khabar-Nâmih</i> No. 19, 30 Murd. 1357, p. 6
Huj. Abdûmat	Arrested, August	Shahsavâr	<i>Khabar-Nâmih</i> No. 19, 30 Murd. 1357, p. 6
Huj. Murtizâ Razavî, Huj. Hamîdzâdih	Arrested, August	Naqdih	<i>Khabar-Nâmih</i> No. 20, 10 Shahr. 1357, p. 5
Huj. Muhammad Taqî	Arrested, August	Îlâm	<i>Ittilâ'ât</i> , 29 Mîhr 1357, p. 21
Huj. Fâzâlî Khurâsânî	Arrested, August	Tehran	<i>Khabar-Nâmih</i> No. 20, 10 Shahr. 1357, p. 5
Huj. Hussein 'Amâdî	Re-exiled, beaten, August	Isfahan	<i>Khabar-Nâmih</i> No. 20, 10 Shahr. 1357, p. 6
Ây. Abdul-Hussein Dastghayb	House arrest, August, jailed, internally exiled	Shiraz, Tehran	<i>Pishtâzân</i> , p. 28; Murâdî Vol. 1, p. 135; <i>Asnâd-i Lânih</i> Vol. 12:2, p. 138
Huj. Muhammad Hussein Sâdiqî	Arrested, August	Yazd	<i>Pishtâzân</i> 1981, p. 128
Huj. 'Abbâs Mûsavî Qûchânî	Arrested, August		Khalkhâlî Vol. 2, p. 452

(continued)

APPENDIX 1. (CONTINUED)

Name:	Repression:	Place:	Source:
<i>1978 (continued)</i>			
30 ruhanis, including Huj. Muhammad Javād Bâhunar and Āy. Mûsavî-Ardabîlî	Arrested at protest, Aug.		Bâhunar 1983, p. 14; <i>Pishtâzân</i> 1981, p. 56; <i>Khabar-Nâmih</i> Special Ed., 25 Murd. 1357, p. 3
Āy. Sâdiq Rûhânî	Arrested, September	Tehran	<i>Khabar-Nâmih</i> No. 1, 10 Mîhr 1357, p. 8
Huj. Khalkhâlî and 3 others	Arrested, September	Naqdih	<i>Khabar-Nâmih</i> No. 3, 17 Mîhr 1357, p. 5
Huj. 'Alî Ausatî	Shot and killed during demonstration, Sept.	Qum	Khalkhâlî Vol. 1, p. 289; <i>Lâlih'hâ</i> , p. 89
Huj. Muhammad Mufattih, Shaykh Yahyâ Nûrî, 9 others	Arrested after martial law declared, September	Tehran etc.	Murâdî Vol. 2, p. 2; <i>Kayhan Int'l</i> , Sept. 13, 1978; Sadûqî 1983, p. 97
Huj. Mihdî Gulpâyagânî	Killed in a car accident, presumably by SAVAK, September		Khalkhâlî Vol. 1, pp. 295-296
Huj. Hussein Nûrî-Hamadânî	Sentenced to 5 years, October	Tehran	<i>Ittilâ'ât</i> , 1 Ābân 1357, p. 17
Tal. Ghulâm-Hussein	Killed during demonstration, November	Qum	Khalkhâlî Vol. 1, p. 277
Tal. Ismâ'îl Bayâtî	Killed in police attack on a school speech	Tuysarkân	Khalkhâlî Vol. 2, p. 121
Tal. Mohammad Bani-Mubâriz	Shot and killed during a demonstration, December	Mashhad	<i>Zamîmih</i> No. 22, Āzar 1357, p. 72; Khalkhâlî Vol. 2, p. 120; <i>Lâlih'hâ</i> , p. 165
Āy. Rabbânî-Shîrâzî	Arrested, December	Shiraz	<i>Zamîmih</i> No. 22, Āzar 1357, p. 75
Āy. Mishkinî and Huj. Ahmad Janatî	Arrested, December	Qum	<i>Zamîmih</i> No. 22, Āzar 1357, p. 75
Tal. Hasan Tavakkulî	Shot and killed in a demonstration, December	Kirmân	Khalkhâlî Vol. 2, p. 115
Huj. Abu-turâb 'Ashûrî	Shot and killed at prayers or during arrest, December	Buhshahr	Khalkhâlî Vol. 1, p. 306; <i>Lâlih'hâ</i> , p. 89; Associated Press, Dec. 5, 1978

(continued)

APPENDIX 1. (CONTINUED)

Name:	Repression:	Place:	Source:
<i>1978 (continued)</i>			
Tal. Muhammad Rûh-bakhsh and Shaykh Mahmûd Bihbûdî	Killed during demonstrations, Dec.	Mashhad, Khalkhâlî	Vol. 1, p. 307; <i>Lâlih'hâ</i> , p. 159
<i>1979</i>			
Shaykh Hussein Shams-Fareidanî	Killed, January	Tehran	<i>Lâlih'hâ</i> , p. 159
Note: Āy. = Āyatullah Huj. = Hujjat al-Islâm Tal. = Talabih (seminary student)			

APPENDIX 2. PARTIAL LISTING OF ATTACKS ON RELIGIOUS SITES IN IRAN, 1978-1979

Date:	Date:	Place:	Source:
18 Day	Jan. 8	Qum: 'Azam Mosque	<i>Dar-Bârih-i Qiyâm</i> Vol. 1, p. 44; <i>Asnâd va Tasâvirî</i> , Vol. 1 Part 3, p. 28; <i>Zamîmih</i> No. 13, p. 17, Farv. 1357
19 Urdîbihisht	May 9	Qum: Āy. Gulpâyagânî's house	<i>Khabar-Nâmih</i> No. 9, 20 Urdîbihisht 1357, p. 6
20 Urdîbihisht	May 10	Qum: Āy. Shari'atmadârî's house	<i>Khabar-Nâmih</i> No. 10, 30 Urdîbihisht 1357, p. 5; <i>Zamîmih</i> No. 18, pp. 64-65, Murdâd 1357
20 Urdîbihisht	May 10	Khomein: Jâma'a Mosque	<i>Khabar-Nâmih</i> No. 11, 10 Khurdâd 1357, p. 4
26 Urdîbihisht	May 16	Qum: Āy. Rûhânî's house	<i>Khabar-Nâmih</i> No. 10, 30 Urdîbihisht 1357, p. 5
5 Khurdâd	May 26	Qum: Āy. Mar'ashî-Najafî's madrasah	<i>Khabar-Nâmih</i> No. 11, 10 Khurdâd 1357, p. 6
6 Khurdâd	May 27	Qum: Āy. Rûhânî's madrasah	<i>Khabar-Nâmih</i> No. 11, 10 Khurdâd 1357, p. 6
12 Khurdâd	June 2	Samnân: Religious Sciences Madrasah	<i>Khabar-Nâmih</i> No. 12, 20 Khurdâd 1357, p. 8
31 Khurdâd	June 21	Shahr-i Rey: Imâmzâdih Ibrâhîm Shrine	<i>Khabar-Nâmih</i> No. 14, 10 Tir 1357, p. 6
30 Tir	July 20	Kushkûyih (near Rafsanjân): mosque	<i>Khabar-Nâmih</i> No. 17, 10 Murdâd 1357, p. 3

(Continued)

APPENDIX 2. (CONTINUED)

<i>Date:</i>	<i>Date:</i>	<i>Place:</i>	<i>Source:</i>
Sha'ban 1398	July	Mashhad: Navâb Madrasedh	<i>Khabar-Nâmih</i> No. 17, 10 Murdâd 1357, p. 6
	July 22	Mashhad: Imâm Rizâ Mosque	Hitselberger 1979, p. 118
19 Murdâd	Aug. 10	Isfahan: Ây. Khâdimî's house	<i>Pârahî</i> , pp. 44-45, 52-53; <i>Asnâd va Tasâvîrî</i> Vol. 1 Part 1, pp. 85-86
8 Ramadan	Aug. 12	Tehran: Sayyid al-Shuhadâ' Mosque	<i>Khabar-Nâmih</i> No. 19, 30 Murdâd 1357, p. 5
9 Ramadan	Aug. 13	Tehran: Amîr al-Mûmanîn Mosque	<i>Khabar-Nâmih</i> No. 19, 30 Murdâd 1357, p. 6
23 Murdâd	Aug. 14	Bihbihân: 2 mosques	<i>Khabar-Nâmih</i> Special Ed., 25 Murdâd 1357, p. 3
24 Murdâd	Aug. 15	Tehran: Larzâdih Mosque	<i>Khabar-Nâmih</i> No. 19, 30 Murdâd 1357, p. 5
25 Murdâd	Aug. 16	Tehran: Shaykh 'Abdulhusein Mosque	<i>Khabar-Nâmih</i> No. 19, 30 Murdâd 1357, p. 5
Early Shahr.	Late Aug.	Tehran (?): Sâdiq Mosque	<i>Khabar-Nâmih</i> No. 20, 10 Shahrivar 1357, p. 5
	Oct. 16	Kirman: mosque	<i>Asnâd-i Lânih-i Jâsâsi</i> Vol. 12 Part 2, pp. 138-139
	Oct. 20	Shahr-i Rey: shrine	N.S.A. Doc. 1610
	Nov. 17-21(?)	Mashhad: Imâm Rizâ Shrine	N.S.A. Docs. 1760, 1792, 1804, 1813
	Dec. 30	Mashhad: Âyatullah Shîrâzî's house	<i>Hambastigî</i> , No. 9, 13 Dey 1357, p. 3
2 Bahman	Jan. 22	Rizâ'iyah: 'Azam Mosque dome shelled	<i>Âyandigân</i> , 3 Bahman 1357, p. 3

Note: Ây. = Âyatullah

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NOTES

1. Similar case studies on religious organizations include Guth (1983) on the Moral Majority's inroads on the Southern Baptists; Mainwaring and Wilde (1988) on the progressives within the Latin American Catholic Church; and Branch (1988) on the civil rights movement's failed takeover of the National Baptist Convention. I am indebted to Professor John D. McCarthy for directing me to this and other literature on the subject.

2. A ruhani is a student or former student of one of the Shi'i seminary schools. Those who receive permission from their teachers to conduct *ijtihâd*, or interpretation of the Qur'an, are allowed to teach and advise and collect religious taxes. Those who do not receive this permission perform administrative and other services. See Fischer (1980a, Chap. 3) and Momen (1985, Chap. 10). The ruhaniyat in Iran is commonly estimated at 180,000, though no sources are given for this figure. "Ruhani" is the contemporary term used by the clerics themselves; other terms are "âlim" (plural: "ulamâ") and the more derogatory "mullâ" and "âkhûnd."

3. The term "mosque network" is in quotation marks because, as I will show, the mosques did not form an entirely cohesive network. However, the term is evocative and widely used, so I will use it as well.

4. The number of mosques in Iran is commonly estimated at 80,000, though no sources are given. Considerably lower figures of 5,386, 8,439 and 9,015 are given in *Iran Almanac* (1975, p. 395), Milani (1988, p. 193), and Akhavi (1980, p. 208), respectively. Milani cites *Guzârish-i Farhang-i Êrân* (Cultural Report of Iran), while Akhavi cites *Âmâr-i Masâjid va Amâkin-i Mutabarrakih-yi Ustânihâ* (Statistics of Mosques and Holy Places of the Provinces), both of which were published in Iran in 1975. Part of the discrepancy may be due to the counting of non-mosque religious buildings such as schools, shrines, offices, residences, and the like.

5. Several authors note—without giving sources—that the ruhaniyat also received unpublicized stipends from the Pahlavi state (for instance, Balta 1980, p. 95; Ledeen and Lewis 1981, pp. 100-101; Tehranian 1980, p. 20). Some have gone so far as to attribute the outbreak of revolution to the reduction of these payments in 1977 (for example, Hoveyda 1980, p. 84).

6. For example: Alidoost-Khaybari (1981, pp. 616-620); Kazemi (1980a, p. 88, and 1980b, pp. 266-267); Moayed-Amini (1980, p. 108); Moshiri (1985, pp. 111-112); Parsa (1989, p. 88); Skocpol (1982, p. 266); Snow and Marshall (1984, p. 138).

7. Salehi (1988, p. 137). See similar statements in Abrahamian (1979, p. 54); Akhavi (1980, p. 172); Ashraf and Banuazizi (1985, p. 27); Burke and Lubeck (1987, p. 661); Esposito (1987, pp. 190-191); Halliday (1979, p. 19); Hiro (1985, p. 168); Laqueur (1979, p. 52); Parsa (1989, p. 306); Petras and Morley (1981, p. 34); Snow and Marshall (1984, p. 141).

8. Leon Trotsky noted that state terror is like war: "A victorious war destroys only an insignificant part of the conquered army, intimidating the remainder and breaking their will. The [state terror] works in the same way: it kills individuals but intimidates thousands." (Trotsky 1961, p. 58, quoted in DeNardo 1985, p. 196)

9. Hashim, interviewed in Mashhad in summer 1978 by Haeri (1989, p. 159). Temporary marriage, according to Haeri's fascinating account, is a legitimate

contractual relation in Shi'i Islam.

10. Respondent 15, interviewed in Istanbul on October 31, 1989. The author's interviews, 83 in all, were conducted primarily in Istanbul, Turkey with Iranian visitors—tourists, business travelers, and government officials—who planned to return to Iran in the near future. An additional 20 expatriates, who had no such plans, were interviewed in Istanbul and the United States. These interviews are discussed more fully in Kurzman (1992).

11. Ismâ'îl (Respondent 65), interviewed in Istanbul on December 5, 1989.

12. The U.S. Embassy in Tehran—not the most reliable source of information on the ruhaniyat—reported in May 1972, "It is generally recognized that the clergy is heavily penetrated by SAVAK...." (document published in *Asnâd-i Lânih-i Jâsûsî*, Vol. 8, p. 31)

13. Pliskin (1980, p. 64) was told this occurred in Jahrom or in Shiraz. Mossavar-Rahmani (1987, pp. 228-229) was told this occurred in Qum. In interviews with Iranian tourists and business travelers in Istanbul in winter 1989-1990, I also heard this story several times.

14. "Moradi," interviewed by Boroumand (1979, p. 63). Poor women in the southern districts of Tehran also feared the relatively public and exposed mosques, and held their conversations at private sessions (Bauer 1983, p. 158).

15. Interviewed by Gage (1978, pp. 132, 134), who misspells "Bazargan" as "Barzegan."

16. Respondent 34, interviewed in Istanbul on November 15, 1989.

17. Sir Anthony Parsons, interviewed in South Devon, England, on January 30 and March 7, 1985, by Shusha Assar (Foundation for Iranian Studies, transcript pp. 31-32).

18. Sa'ïd Rajâ'î-Khurâsânî, interviewed in New York on December 21, 1984, by Zia Sedghi (Harvard Iranian Oral History Collection, tape 1, pp. 12, 13).

19. Tilly (1978, pp. 7, 78) uses the term "control" in a different way, to describe a group's collective use of its individual members' resources. I'm suggesting here that a group must contend with non-members', as well as members', claims on the group's actual and potential resources.

20. Ismâ'îl (Respondent 65), interviewed in Istanbul on December 5, 1989.

21. Esposito (1987, p. 191). See similar comments in Algar (1983, p. 11); Braswell (1979); Millward (1980); Moaddel (1992); and Savory (1979).

22. Quoted in Khomeini's 1971 book, "Islamic Government," which is translated in Khomeini (1981, p. 68); discussed in Akhavi (1980, p. 165); Dabashi (1993, p. 444); Fischer and Abedi (1990, p. 135); and Momen (1985, p. 198).

23. Historical case studies on this subject include Akhavi (1980); Algar (1969); Arjomand (1984); and Hairî (1988). In the 17th century, French visitor Jean Chardin noted the debate between the king's legitimacy and the ruhaniyat's (Keddie 1981, p. 23).

24. Ahmad Khomeini, Imam Khomeini's son, quoted in the newspaper *Ittilâ'ât*, 1 Mihr 1358 (September 23, 1979), p. 2. Further evidence comes from sociologist Said Amir Arjomand, who interviewed two dozen high-ranking ruhanis in Iran in 1977, a year before the revolution, and found their grievances expressed almost entirely in reformist terms. Interviewed in Berkeley on September 15, 1989.

25. Quoted in an anonymous account printed in *Dar-bârih-i Qiyâm-i Hamâsih-Âfarinân-i Qum va Tabrîz*, Vol. 1 (1978, p. 44), a slightly different form of which appears also in *Asnâd va Tasâvirî*, Vol. 1 Part 3 (1978, p. 28) and *Zamîmih-i Khabar-Nâmih*, No. 13, Farvardîn 1357 (March-April 1978), p. 17.

26. Through a representative, Khomeini helped support seminary students in Qum (Fischer 1980a, pp. 80-81).

27. One former seminary student estimates that only 40 percent of his fellow students at Qum were active politically on the eve of the revolution. Ismâ'îl (Respondent 65), interviewed in Istanbul on December 11, 1989. This figure had been bolstered by the large number of Khomeini's students expelled from Iraq in the mid-1970s, including Hasan, a cleric interviewed in Istanbul on November 11, 1989. See also Akhavi (1980, p. 129); Arjomand (1988a, p. 86); Fisoher (1980a, p. 78); and Siddiqui (1981, p. 319).

28. Pilgrimage figures are estimated in Iran Almanac (1977, p. 394). On neighborhood associations see Arjomand (1988a, p. 92). On mystical groups see Bayat (1987, p. 68). On intellectual interest see *Asnâd-i Lânih-i Jâsûsî* (Vol. 7, p. 60). On urbanized peasants see Goodell (1986, p. 294). Sadri and Sadri (1985, p. 145) note, however, that at the same time only three small Friday prayer services were held regularly in all of Tehran.

29. 'Alî (Respondent 7), a former seminary student at Qum, interviewed in New Jersey on October 14, 1989.

30. This and other statements are quoted in part in *Dar-bârih-i Qiyâm*, Vol. 1 (1978, pp. 40-44), a slightly different form of which appears also in *Asnâd va Tasâvirî*, Vol. 1 Part 3 (1978, pp. 26-28) and *Zamîmih-i Khabar-Nâmih*, No. 13, Farvardîn 1357 (March-April 1978), pp. 15-17.

31. Government and opposition casualty figures varied widely. The official count was 9 dead, but estimates ranged up to 200 dead (Algar 1983, p. 103; Bashiriyyeh 1984, p. 113).

32. These statements are printed in full in *Dar-bârih-i Qiyâm*, Vol. 1 (1978, pp. 83-89). According to Fischer (1980a, p. 194) and *The Washington Post* (January 20, 1978, p. A31), Shari'at-Madârî declared the government "non-Islamic" or "un-Islamic," which is a somewhat broader statement than the one reprinted in *Dar-bârih-i Qiyâm*, Vol. 1 (1978, p. 86): "I judge such acts to be seriously opposed to the law of God and to humanity." (emphasis added).

33. According to Nahavandi (1981, pp. 120-121), the police refused to re-open the mosque even when ordered to do so by the head of SAVAK.

34. See the anonymous pamphlets translated by Patriotic Muslim Students of Tabriz University (1978, pp. 62-64) and Union des Étudiants Iraniens en France (1978, pp. 11-12). The identity of these radicals, like much else about the events of this day, is unclear. It is likely that they were followers of Khomeini, though, since the only other consistently confrontational group, the university students, were busy with protests of their own that day at the Tabriz University campus, according to Rajâ'î-Khurâsânî (Harvard Iranian Oral History Collection, tape 1, p. 21).

35. See the memorandum of the U.S. Consul in Tabriz to the embassy in Tehran, February 21, 1978 (*Asnâd-i Lânih-i Jâsûsî* Vol. 61, p. 96). Again, official and opposition casualty counts differ: the government admitted to 11 deaths (Ramazani 1982, p. 104), while the opposition claimed 500 (Algar 1983, p. 103; Fidirasiyûn 1978, p. 78).

36. Pronouncement of 22 Rabi'i I 1398 (March 2, 1978), published in Davānī (Vol. 7, p. 99). As part of his denunciation after the revolution, Shari'at-Madārf was later accused of having criticized "anarchy" in Tabriz (see Parsa 1989, p. 202).

37. Described in proclamations collected in *Zamīnih-i Khabar-Nāmih*, No. 20, Mihr 1357 (September-October 1978), pp. 28-29; *Pārahī az I'lāmīyih'hā* (1978, pp. 41-54); and *Asnād va Tasāvīrī*, Vol. 1 Part 1 (1978, pp. 85-86).

38. This version is reported by an Isfahan city official, who is quoted in Kraft (1978, p. 139); by the National Front's *Khabar-Nāmih*, Special Edition, 25 Murdād 1357 (August 16, 1978), pp. 2-3; and by a group called Asnāf-i Isfahān (Isfahan Guilds), whose proclamation is reproduced in *Asnād va Tasāvīrī*, Vol. 1 Part 1 (pp. 85-86) and in *Pārahī az I'lāmīyih'hā* (1978, pp. 43-45). Other accounts state that the refuge-seekers were already leaving peacefully when they were attacked; see the proclamations of Mardum-i Mubāriz-i Isfahān (The Fighting People of Isfahan) and of Dānishjūyān-i Musalmān Mubāriz-i Isfahān (The Fighting Muslim Students of Isfahan), reprinted in *Pārahī* (1978, pp. 41 and 52).

39. Letter of 13 Tīr 1357 (July 4, 1978), translated by Parsa (1989, p. 204). The full letter is published in *Zamīnih-i Khabar-Nāmih*, No. 20, Mihr 1357 (September-October 1978), p. 29, and *Asnād va Tasāvīrī*, Vol. 1 Part 3, (p. 63).

40. This information is suspect as it comes from a figure close to the shah's court, who had good reason to want to discredit the revolutionaries. The information is reported as true by U.S. Embassy officials in memoranda, May 15 and 23, 1978, printed in *Asnād-i Lānih-i Jāsūsī* (Vol. 25, pp. 25-26, 31). Parsa (1989, p. 201) lists, with citations, several instances of violence against pro-government clerics, of whom there were several. See also *The New York Times*, January 29, 1979, p. A4.

41. Binder (1979, p. 53). SAVAK memoranda describing two contacts with Shari'at-Madārf are published in Rūhānī (1982, pp. 146-157). This book was part of an official post-revolutionary campaign to discredit Shari'at-Madārf which led eventually to his house arrest.

42. On Isfahan see U.S. Consul David C. McGaffey's memos of December 6, 1978 (printed in *Asnād-i Lānih-i Jāsūsī*, Vol. 13, Part 1, pp. 81-83) (but see also Abrahamian 1982, pp. 526-527); on Hamadan see Khosrokhavar (1979, p. 87).

43. Examples of each: a demonstration in Qazvin (S.T. Escudero memorandum of January 9, 1979, printed in *Asnād-i Lānih-i Jāsūsī*, Vol. 27, pp. 6-7); a strike in Yazd (Dehqani-Tafti 1981, pp. 9-10); food distribution in Tehran (Afrāsīyābī and Dihqān 1981, p. 354); neighborhood security in Hamadan (Khosrokhavar 1979, p. 88); arms distribution in Tehran (Barāhinī 1979, p. 125).

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